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Abstract
We explore the transitional dynamics in an Overlapping Generations framework with and without
heuristic switching. Agents use simple heuristics to forecast the interest rate and the real wage.
The fraction of agents using a specific heuristic depends on its relative forecasting performance.
In the absence of heuristic switching, the results indicate that there is a lot of variation in the
transitional dynamics over different parameter values and heuristics. They might even oscillate or
diverge. Including heuristic switching has two advantages. First, it decreases the variation in the
transitional dynamics significantly. Second, it has a stabilising effect on oscillating or diverging
transitional dynamics.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the stability and transitional dynamics of an Overlapping Generations model with
heuristic switching. Accordingly, this paper contributes to a growing literature that goes beyond the
rational expectations paradigm. After all, the transitional and equilibrium impact of public policy, for
instance, on the macroeconomy depends crucially on the behavioural response of households to these
policies. An important determinant of this behavioural response is the procedure households apply
to form expectations regarding the future course of different variables. Moreover, these expectations
themselves are typically a key determinant of the current realisation of these variables. Several authors
have argued that assuming that economic agents have rational expectations (RE) is unrealistic. An
alternative is provided by the learning literature (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). In this
literature, boundedly rational agents form expectations using a perceived law of motion. In the lion’s
share of this literature, agents act as econometricians who update the coefficients of their perceived
law of motion as new realisations of the variables of interest become available over time.
A number of papers studied the effects of least-squares adaptive learning within an Overlapping
Generations framework (henceforth OLG) - see e.g. Schönhofer (1998), Adam (2003), Tuinstra (2003)
and Tuinstra and Wagener (2007). In Schönhofer (1998), for example, it is shown that if one explicitly
considers learning in a monetary OLGmodel, the dynamic system exhibits chaotic behaviour. Tuinstra
(2003), on the other hand, introduces the notion of beliefs equilibria. These are equilibria where
the belief of the agents best fits the time series data, which itself is generated by the model where
agents have this belief. Although the learning dynamics might converge, the author shows that the
corresponding inflation dynamics might be erratic. Different from these studies, Chen et al. (2008)
study the dynamic behaviour of an OLG model with capital accumulation under three different types
of expectations: rational, myopic and adaptive expectations. They conclude that the dynamics can be
complex when using the latter two types. Moreover, the dynamic properties of the model crucially
depend on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and, in the case of
adaptive expectations, on the weight agents attach to past observations when forming expectations.
All these papers have enriched our knowledge of the properties that characterise OLG models
when moving beyond the scope of rational expectations. The majority of the papers using an OLG
framework, however, focus on the (mostly local) stability properties of the equilibrium, not on the
transitional dynamics following policy shocks. A second shortcoming is that often only one forecast-
ing rule is studied. If the agents act as econometricians, they constantly update the coefficients of the
same equation, but they cannot distinguish or switch between different rules. Furthermore, even if
multiple rules are studied simultaneously, it is virtually always assumed that all agents use the same
rule at a given point in time. In these papers, the focus often lies exclusively with one-period-ahead
forecasts as well, ruling out the possibility of multi-period-ahead forecasts.
It is, however, plausible that a fraction of the economic agents does not have the cognitive ca-
pacities to act as an econometrician. Just as it can not be ruled out a priori that different forecasting
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rules are being used by the economic agents at one point in time. So then, what is the macroeconomic
impact if one would assume that economic agents use simple rules to forecast wages and interest
rates? Additionally, how do the transitional dynamics behave when individuals have multiple rules to
choose from? And are the transitional dynamics sensitive to the rule being used? Finally, how do they
compare to the transitional dynamics in the rational expectations case?
In this paper, we assume that agents use such simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the future course
of the interest rate and the real wage. Agents use these heuristics because, in general, they do not
possess the cognitive abilities as assumed by the RE literature nor to act as econometricians. Instead,
the agents have a certain number of different heuristics at their disposal. On a regular basis, they assess
the predictive power of the heuristic they are currently applying. If it performs well, the probability
that agents will use the same heuristic in the next period will be higher. If it does not perform well,
there is a higher probability that they switch to another rule.
The framework used to answer these questions is in line with the evidence provided by several
laboratory experiments - see e.g. Adam (2007), Hommes (2011) , Heemeijer et al. (2012) and Hommes
(2014). In Heemeijer et al. (2012), for example, the authors use a standard OLG framework to con-
duct an individual experiment in order to assess the ability of individuals to form expectations and
the degree to which these individuals learn about the accuracy of their forecasts. In the experiment,
participants are asked to submit fifty one-step-ahead forecasts for the inflation rate. Over time, the
participants also observe the actual realisations of the inflation rate. These can be used by the par-
ticipants to forecast the remaining future inflation rates. The authors argue that their experimental
results cannot be explained using the rational expectations approach. Rather, they are consistent with
the use of constant gain algorithms or average expectations. Their results also indicate that individuals
switch between different heuristics according to the relative forecasting performance of these rules.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature that goes beyond the rational expectations
paradigm by exploiting the heuristic switching approach within an Overlapping Generations model.
Triggered by a fiscal policy shock, the objective is to study the transitional dynamics of the model
for a large number of settings including one or multiple heuristics and compare the behaviour of the
dynamics with their rational expectations counterpart.
The simulations lead to three main findings. First, in a context without heuristic switching (i.e. a
context where individuals only have one heuristic at their disposal to form expectations), the evolution
of transitional dynamics can be substantially different from the rational expectations case, especially
in the first periods of the transition. Rational expectations is thus not always a good approximation.
Furthermore, there is a lot of variation in the dynamics over different parameter values and heuristics.
This finding implies that if only heuristic is used, the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy is highly
sensitive to the heuristic being used. What is more, as the discount rate and the degree of risk aversion
decrease, the model becomes unstable and the corresponding transitional dynamics oscillate or even
diverge.
Second, after activating the heuristic switching regime, the variation in the transitional dynamics
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decreases significantly. Consequently, the sensitivity of the transitional effects of fiscal policy is much
lower now and its exact impact is thus less uncertain for policy makers.
Third and last, the heuristic switching has a stabilising effect on the transitional dynamics. For cer-
tain configurations of the parameter values for which the dynamics were very unstable in the absence
of heuristic switching, the dynamics now converge to the steady state in most cases.
These findings are important. They imply that allowing individuals to choose from a wide range
of forecasting rules is actually a better option than constraining them to use only forecasting rule.
It allows them to select the rules that perform relatively better, a feature that not only enhances the
stability of the model, but reduces the uncertainty in the transitional dynamics as well. It implies that
going beyond rational expectations does not lead to a wide range of possible trajectories. Furthermore,
it turns out that rational expectations is a better approximation when the switching mechanism is
activated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the different model blocks.
Section 3 focuses on the heuristic switching. In Section 4, we provide some details on the timing in
the model. Section 5 describes the equilibrium of the model. The calibration and parameterisation of
the model is described in Section 6. Section 7 consists of the description and a detailed look into the
results of the different simulations. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a closed economy in which time is discrete and runs from 0 to1. Each period lasts for
4 years. At each moment in time, the economy is populated by J overlapping generations. The model
consists of three actors: heterogeneous agents, firms, and a fiscal government. Markets are incomplete
meaning that individuals cannot explicitly insure themselves against productivity shocks.
2.1 Demographics
At the beginning of each period, a continuum of new agents with measure one enters the model.
Individuals have an uncertain lifespan. They face an age-specific survival probability 'j between the
age of j and j + 1. The demographics of the model are exogenous and given by:
Nj+1,t+1 = 'jNj,t (1)
where Nj,t represents the number of individuals of age j at time t. Every individual who survives J
periods will die with certainty after the J-th period.
4
2.2 Individuals
Individuals enter the model at the age of 18. Ex-ante, before any decisions are made, individuals only
differ with respect to the heuristic they apply to form expectations. Furthermore, the economic agents
face idiosyncratic income risk during their active period of life. At any given point in time, individuals
are characterised by a state vector (j, a, ⌘, h), where j is the age of the agent, a the accumulated non-
human wealth at the beginning of period t, ⌘ the productivity shock and h the heuristic that the agents
is currently applying. Let  j,t(a, ⌘, h) denote the share of agents aged j of type (a, ⌘, h) at date t. For
each t and j we have
´
 t,j(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) = 1.
Individuals choose sequences of (n, c, a0), i.e. labor supply, consumption and accumulated non-
human wealth, to maximise their expected lifetime utility. The latter is given by
U = E
8<:
JX
j=1
 j 1
 
cj(1 µ)(1  nj)µ
 1 ✓
1  ✓
9=; . (2)
The share of consumption is given by 1   µ. The degree of relative risk aversion is governed by ✓.
The time discount factor is denoted by  . Individuals reaching the age of JR retire.
The dynamic budget constraint of an individual aged j < JR with state (a, ⌘, h) at time t is given
by
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = wt⌘"jnj(1  ⌧) + (1 + rt(1  ⌧k))(aj + Trt) (3)
He or she earns an after-tax wage of wt"j⌘nj(1   ⌧), where wt is the real wage per unit of effective
labour at time t, "j is an age-specific productivity parameter, ⌘ is the labour productivity shock and
⌧ is the average tax rate on labour income. The consumption tax rate is ⌧c. The real interest rate is
given by rt. Individuals pay taxes on capital income where the capital tax rate is denoted by ⌧k. Indi-
viduals enter the model without wealth and leave no intentional bequests. Due to accidental bequests,
individuals receive a transfer Trt from the government. The accumulated non-human wealth at the
end of the period is denoted by a0. We impose that individuals are not able to borrow: a0   0. This
individual maximises the following recursive problem:
V (j, a, ⌘, h) = max
cj ,nj ,a0j
U(cj , nj) +  'j
X
⌘0
⇡(⌘0|⌘)V (j + 1, a0, ⌘0, h) (4)
The stochastic process regarding the labor productivity shock is denoted by ⇡(⌘0|⌘). The heuristic
used is given by h. From the age of JR onwards, individuals receive a public pay-as-you-go pension.
Their budget constraint for the ages j   JR is given by
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = (1 + rt(1  ⌧k))(aj + Trt) + ppt (5)
The maximisation problem is now given by
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V (j, a, h) = max
c,a0
U(cj) +  'jV (j + 1, a
0, h) (6)
A final note on the basic PAYG-pension ppt received by the retired households in the model. For
simplicity, it is assumed that all individuals receive the same pension, i.e. a fraction bp of the average
after-tax wage in the economy.
2.3 Firms
The production function of the representative firm is given by
Yt = AK
↵
t L
1 ↵
t (7)
where A is the level of technology that assumed to be constant over time,Kt is the capital used by the
firm, and Lt is given by
Lt =
JR 1X
j=1
Nj,t
ˆ
nj(a, ⌘, h)⌘"j t,j(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) (8)
2.4 Government
Government expenditures on goods and public pensions are financed by taxes on labour, capital and
consumption. The fraction of output that is devoted to government consumption gc is adjusted such
that the government budget is balanced every period. Formally, the government budget constraint is
given by
Gc,t + Pt = Tn,t + Tc,t + Tk,t (9)
with:
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Gct = gcYt
Pt =
PJ
j=jR
Nj,t
´
ppt j,t(da⇥ dh)
Tkt = ⌧krtKt
Tnt = ⌧
PJR 1
j=1 Nj,t
´
wtnj(a, ⌘, h)⌘"j j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
Tct = ⌧c
PJ
j=1Nj,t
´
cj(a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
3 Heuristic switching
In this paper, we take the view that economic agents have limited cognitive capabilities. In such a
world, individuals use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the evolution of aggregate macroeconomic
variables and to form expectations. Notwithstanding their limited cognitive capabilities, economic
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agents are willing to learn from their mistakes. To this end, we combine the use of heuristics with
a trial-and-error learning approach1. More specifically, economic agents have different heuristics at
their disposal and they endogenously select the heuristic or forecasting rule that performed the best
in previous periods. On a regular basis, individuals assess the predictive power of the heuristic they
are currently using vis-à-vis the predictive power of the other rules. If the current rule performs well,
the probability that an individual will keep on using the same rule is higher. If not, there is a higher
probability that he or she will switch.
The different heuristics at the disposal of an individual to form expectations are the following2:
r1,et+s,t = r
1,e
t,t 1 +  1(rt   r1,et,t 1) (Adaptive (1)) (10)
r2,et+s,t = rt +  2(rt   rt 1) (Trend (1)) (11)
r3,et+s,t =
1
 3
 3 1X
j=0
rt j (Average (1)) (12)
r4,et+s,t =
 4 1X
j=0
 jrt j (Average (2)) (13)
r5,et+s,t = rt (Myopic) (14)
with s 2 {1, ..., J}. In these equations, both actual realisations (rt) and expected values (rh,et+s,t) of
the interest rate are given. The subscript t in rt denotes the historical period t in which the realisation
occurred. On the other hand, rh,et+s,t is the expectation at time t of the interest rate in period t+ s using
heuristic h. For example, r1,et,t 1 is the expectation at time t  1 using the first heuristic of the interest
rate at time t.
The first heuristic boils down to an adaptive expectations approach to form forecasts. It states
that the expectation of an individual regarding the evolution of the interest rate equals r1,et,t 1, the
expectation of the interest rate in the current period t made at time t   1, and a fraction  1 of the
forecast error, i.e. the difference between the actual realisation of the interest rate rt and r
1,e
t,t 1. The
second one is a trend rule. Here, r2,et+1,t equals the actual realisation of the interest rate rt plus a
fraction  2 of the difference between the current and previous realisation of the interest rate. Agents
expect higher interest rates in the future when the current interest rate rt is higher than the previous
interest rate rt 1 and vice versa. When  1 and  2 are low, individuals are less inclined to adjust
1For an in-depth analysis of the use of heuristics and heuristic switching, we refer the reader to De Grauwe (2012),
Heemeijer et al. (2012) and Hommes (2014).
2In this section, we only provide the different heuristics for the evolution of the interest rate. Note that agents form
expectations about wages as well using the same heuristic, and the heuristics that they use to do so are equivalent to the ones
stated in this section. Furthermore, these heuristics are based on the heuristics provided in Hommes (2014).
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their expectations. When  1 and  2 are high, individuals will be more inclined when adjusting their
expectations. The third heuristic implies that the expected interest rate for the next period equals an
unweighted average of the last  3 realisations of the interest rate, while in the fourth heuristic r
4,e
t+1,t
is determined using a weighted average of the last  4 realisations of the interest rate. Finally, the fifth
heuristic is equivalent to the use of myopic expectations. Individuals simply assume that the interest
in the next period will equal the current realisation of the interest rate.
Agents using heuristic h at t use this heuristic to form rh,et+s,t (s 2 {1, .., J   j}, J denoting the
maximum age an individual can reach and j denoting the actual age), i.e. the expected values at time
t of the interest rate and the real wage in the remaining periods of their life. In period t + 1, they
will update their expectations of these values as new information becomes available. For the last three
heuristics (Equations (12-14)), we assume that the agents using these heuristics expect that the new
value applies for the remainder of their life. Thus, for example, if the individual has at most three more
periods to live after the current period, expectations for these periods held at time t are the following:
rh,et+1,t = r
h,e
t+2,t = r
h,e
t+3,t. In the next period, however, the updated expected values for the last two
periods of life (rh,et+2,t+1 = r
h,e
t+3,t+1) might differ from the expected values for these periods at time
t (rh,et+2,t = r
h,e
t+3,t). In other words, agents assume that the expected value at time t applies for the
remainder of their life. In time t+1, the expected value itself might change, but they still assume that
this new expected value applies for the remainder of their life.
For the first two heuristics, we use two different versions. In one version, we use the same as-
sumption as for the last three heuristics, namely that the forecast for the next period rh,et+1,t equals the
forecast for the subsequent periods as well. In the second version, though, to form expectations for
the periods t+ 2, t+ 3, t+ 4, ... the heuristics are adjusted as follows:
r6,et+s,t = r
6,e
t+s 1,t +
 1
 5s
(rt   r6,et,t 1), s 2 {1, ..., J   j} , (Adaptive (2)) (15)
r7,et+s,t = r
7,e
t+s 1,t +
 2
 6s
(rt   rt 1), s2 {1, ..., J   j} , (Trend (2)) (16)
where s is the number of remaining periods of life. Heuristic 6 implies that the individual observes
the forecast error rt   r6,et,t 1 and acknowledges that he or she might make forecasting errors in the
future. Using the forecast error, he or she iterates forward to form expectations for the interest rate in
period t+ j. The term  5s then captures to what extent he or she thinks that they will make the same
forecasting error in the future. For the last heuristic, the basic idea is the same, but now it captures to
what extent an individual thinks that the trend will continue in the future.
In total agents have seven different heuristics at their disposal. Consistent with the literature on
Heuristic Switching Models, the performance of heuristic h 2 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) is measured by the
squared prediction error of that specific rule ⇥t,h in a specific period t:
⇥t,h =  (rt   rh,et,t 1)2 +  ⇥t 1,h (17)
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All that is left to be specified is the fraction of agents using a specific heuristic h. Using a discrete
choice model, this is given by
 h,t = ⇠ h,t 1 + (1  ⇠) exp(k⇥t 1,h)P7
h=1exp(k⇥t 1,h)
(18)
Here,  h,t measures the fraction of individuals using heuristic h at period t. This means thatP7
h=1  h,t = 1. Furthermore,   2[0,1] is a parameter measuring the memory of the economic agents.
The lower  , the less economic agents take past periods into account when comparing heuristics.
Furthermore, k   0 is the intensity of choice. The larger k, the faster agents switch between heuristics.
The last parameter is ⇠ 2 [0, 1], measuring inertia. If this parameter is low, economic agents switch
less to other heuristics even if they clearly perform better. In other words, the habit of using a certain
heuristic is stronger.
4 Timing
Each period, a number of decisions have to be made by the individuals populating the economy. These
sequential steps are:
1. Given their expectations, individuals decide on the amount of labour they want to supply to the
labour market.
2. Based on Kt and Lt, rt and wt are determined. These values of wt and rt do not change the
value of n. Labour has already been supplied to the labour market.
3. Individuals receive their labour (based on n as determined in step 2) and capital income. After-
wards, they decide on c and a0.
4. They evaluate the heuristic they are applying using Equation (17). Afterwards, the heuristic
switching takes place.
5. Having observed the actual realisation of the interest rate and the wage, individuals update their
expectations about the future values of the interest rate and the real wage rate using the heuristic
they are using.
5 Definition of Equilibrium
Let  j,t(a, ⌘, h) denote the share of agents aged j at time t with state (a, ⌘, h). For each j and t we
have
´
 j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) = 1.
Definition 1 Given an initial capital stock K0, a given vector of exogenous fiscal policy vari-
ables {⌧c,t, ⌧k,t, ⌧t, bp,t}1t=1 and initial measures { j,0}Jj=1, an intertemporal equilibrium consists of
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sequences of value and policy functions {Vt, a0j,t, cj,t, nj,t}1t=0, sequences of transfers {Trt}1t=0, se-
quences of prices {wt, rt}1t=0, sequences of expectations
n
rh,et+k,t, w
h,e
r+k,t
o1
t=1
, sequences of taxes, so-
cial security policies, tax aggregates and government spending {Gc, Tn,t, Tk,t, Tc,t, ppt}1t=1, aggregate
variables {Yt,Kt, Lt}1t=0 and sequences of measures { j,t}1t=0 such that:
1. Given expectations rh,et+k,t andw
h,e
t+k,t and government policies, n(j, a, ⌘, h) is the optimal labour
supply of an individual with state n(j, a, ⌘, h).
2. Given prices rt and wt, government policies, expectations r
h,e
t+k,t and w
h,e
t+k,t, and the labour
supply n(j, a, ⌘, h) as decided in the beginning of period t, Vt satisfies the Bellman equations
as given in subsection 2.2 for all states (j, a, ⌘, h), where {a0j,t, cj,t} are the related policy func-
tions.
3. Interest rates and wages are given by:
rt = ↵A
✓
Lt
Kt
◆(1 ↵)
    (19)
and
wt = (1  ↵)A
✓
Kt
Lt
◆↵
(20)
4. The pension ppt is determined by:
ppt = bp,t
0BBBBBB@
JR 1X
j=1
Lj,t
´
wtn(j, a, ⌘, h)⌘"j(1  ⌧) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
JR 1X
j=1
Lj,t
1CCCCCCA (21)
where bp,t is the net replacement rate for the individuals.
5. The transfer Trt+1 is determined by:
Trt+1 =
0BBBBB@
JX
j=1
(1  'j)Nj,t
´
a0(j, a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
JX
j=1
Nj,t+1
1CCCCCA (22)
6. Expectations rh,et+k,t and w
h,e
t+k,t are updated using Equations (10-16).
7. The performance of the heuristic and the fraction of individuals using a certain heuristic is
determined via Equations (17-18).
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8. The capital market, the labour market and the goods market clear every period t:
Kt+1 =
JX
j=1
Nj,t
ˆ
a0(j, a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) (23)
Lt =
JR 1X
j=1
Nj,t
ˆ
n(j, a, e,⇡, ⌘, H)"j⌘ (da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) (24)
Yt =
JX
j=1
Nj,t
ˆ
c(j, a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) +Gc,t + (Kt+1   (1   )Kt) (25)
9. Government policies {Gc, Tn,t, Tk,t, Tc,t} are determined using Equation (9) and the fraction
of Yt used for government spending (gc) is endogenously determined such that the government
budget is balanced each period:
gc =
Tn,t + Tc,t + Tk,t   PPt
Yt
(26)
10. Yt is determined by equation (7).
11.  j+1,t+1 = Zj,t( j,t)where Zj,t is the law of motion induced by the exogenous mortality rates,
the exogenous Markov process for labour productivity, the endogenous asset accumulation and
the heuristic switching regime.
6 Data and calibration
In this section, the parameterisation and calibration of the model is outlined in detail. The lion’s share
of the calibration is in line with the literature on quantitative OLG models with idiosyncratic risk. The
model is calibrated to Belgium for the period 2000-2007.
6.1 Demographics
Agents enter the economy at the age of 18 (model age = 1), retire at the age of 66 (model age = 13) and
live at most until the age of 94 years. Each period in the model lasts for four years. The conditional
survival probabilities {'j} are taken from the Human Mortality Database and are for 2000.
6.2 Technology and employment
The parameters regarding technology are {↵, A,  }. The capital share in production ↵ equals 0.36.
The level of technology A is constant and normalised such that the equilibrium real wage rate in
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the benchmark model w is equal to 1. The depreciation rate   is calibrated using a target for the
equilibrium annual real interest rate of r = 4.5%.
6.3 Labour productivity shocks and parameters
In the model, an individual of age j and idiosyncratic shock ⌘ who works n hours will earn a pre-tax
wage of
wnj⌘"j (27)
We use the specification reported by Cournède and Gonand (2006) to calibrate the age-specific pro-
ductivity profile "j . The resulting profile is hump-shaped.
The productivity shock ⌘ can take three values: ⌘ 2 {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3}. The Markov transition matrix is
a (3x3)-matrix:
⌦ =
264⇢11 ⇢12 ⇢13⇢21 ⇢22 ⇢23
⇢31 ⇢32 ⇢33
375 (28)
where ⇢ij is the probability Pr(j|i) to end up in state j in the next period given state i in the cur-
rent period. Taking all this information together, the states of the Markov chain {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3} and the
Markov transition matrix ⌦ still have to be determined. For the labor productivity states {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3}
in the labor earnings process, we use a discretised Markov chain for a continuous AR(1)-process with
persistence ⇣s and variance  2⌘ . The persistence is chosen to be 0.969 and the variance 0.01 (Krueger
and Ludwig, 2013).
The markov transition matrix for the idiosyncratic productivity risk is then given by
⌦ =
2640.8851 0.1113 0.00350.0557 0.8887 0.0557
0.0035 0.1113 0.8851
375
while the values for ⌘1, ⌘2 and ⌘3 are respectively 0.6029, 1 and 1.6587.
6.4 Preferences
The instantaneous utility function of the individuals is given by Equation (2)3. The parameters to
be calibrated are { , µ, ✓}. As in Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Krueger and Ludwig (2013), ✓ is
chosen to be 4. The relative weight on leisure µ, on the other hand, is determined such that Belgian
employed individuals work on average 1/3 of their time. Using the values of µ and ✓, a coefficient of
relative risk aversion of approximately 2 is obtained. Finally,   is set to 0.96.
3This functional form is often used in the quantitative OLG literature with idiosyncratic risk: see e.g. Conesa and
Krueger (2006) and Krueger and Ludwig (2013)
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Table 1: Calibration summary
Parameter values
Weight on leisure in utility function µ 0.6164 Average fraction of time spent working = 1/3
Discount factor in utility function   0.96
Coefficient of risk aversion ✓ 4 Conesa and Krueger (2006); Krueger and Ludwig (2013)
Level of technology A 4.478 w = 1
Capital share in production ↵ 0.36
Depreciation rate   0.36 r = 4.5%
Age-specific component of wages "j Cournède and Gonand (2006)
Tax rate on labour ⌧ 52.2% Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013)
Tax rate on consumption ⌧c 13.4% Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013)
Tax rate on capital ⌧k 26.8% McDaniel (2007)
Net replacement rate pension bp 0.631 OECD, Pensions at a Glance (2005)
6.5 Fiscal policy variables
The government in the model finances spending on goods and PAYG pensions with taxes on con-
sumption, capital and labour. For the tax rates ⌧c and ⌧ , we use the same data as Heylen and Van de
Kerckhove (2013). For details on the construction of these fiscal policy variables, we refer to Heylen
& Van de Kerckhove (2013, their Appendix 1). The value for the capital tax rate ⌧k is determined us-
ing the tax series constructed by Cara McDaniel. we use the average between 2000-20074. Regarding
the basic PAYG-pension received by the retired households in the model, we use data on the average
net replacement rate after retirement obtained from the OECD (Pensions at a Glance, 2005).
7 Simulations
7.1 Set-up
The goal of this paper is go beyond the rational expectations paradigm and use heuristics to study
the transitional dynamics following fiscal policy shocks. In this section, we explore the effects of an
unanticipated permanent labour tax decrease financed by government spending. We proceed in two
steps. In the first step, we assume that economic agents have only one of the available heuristics to
form expectations at their disposal. Thus, at this point there is no heuristic switching. In a second
step, we perform the same analysis, however, now we do use the heuristic switching framework: i.e.
we assume that agents evaluate the performance of the heuristic they are currently using. According
to its relative performance to other heuristics, individuals might switch to a different heuristic. All the
results discussed in the following subsections are for the scenario in which ⌧ is reduced from 52.2%
to 42.2%.
4The updated tax series can be downloaded from www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers. The methodology is discussed
in McDaniel (2007).
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7.1.1 No heuristic switching
We perform the analysis in step 1 for different parameter values for the discount factor  , the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion ✓ and the parameters  1,  2,  5 and  6 governing the adaptive and trend
heuristics. For  , we use two different and rather extreme values: 0.98 and 0.86, whereas ✓ takes the
values 2 and 45. The lower (higher) the value of ✓, the higher (lower) the Frish elasticity of labour
supply and the more (less) individuals respond to different real wage rates. For  1 and  2, the two
values are 0.1 and 0.9. In the latter case, individuals are much faster in adjusting their expectations
to current evolutions. To conclude, the values used for  5 and  6 are 1 and 2. Higher values for the
latter two variables indicate that current evolutions matter less in the future. The values for  3,  4
and  j remain constant over all scenarios. For the first two, we attach the value of 5. That means
that individuals take a total period of 20 years to average. The weights  j are determined using the
formula 9 2j25 , meaning that the weights are 9/25 for the current period, 7/25 for the previous period,
and 5/25, 3/25 and 1/25 for the other periods.
Thus, we end up with 4 parameter combinations of   and ✓. For each of these combinations,
we have 4 different combinations for each of the adaptive expectations heuristics (Equations (10) and
(15)), 4 different combinations for each of the trend rule heuristics (Equations (11) and (16)) and 1
single specification for the other three heuristics (Equations (12-14)), leading to a total number of 76
scenarios.
7.1.2 Heuristic switching
Of course, not all individuals use the same heuristic to form expectations about the future realisations
of the interest rate and the real wage rate. It is more realistic to assume that individuals have more than
one heuristic at their disposal to form expectations. Therefore, a next step is activating the heuristic
switching framework. For these simulations, we use the same range of parameter values for  , ✓,
 1,  2,  5 and  6. The values for  3,  4 and  j are the same as well. Furthermore, we have to
choose values for the parameters  , ⇠ and k. For the first parameter  , measuring the degree to which
individuals take the past performance of heuristics into account, the values 0.2 and 0.9 are used. In the
first (last) case, individuals attach low (high) weight to errors in the past. For the second parameter ⇠,
measuring the degree of inertia in the switching of individuals between different heuristics, the values
0.1 and 0.9 are used. The latter value indicates that the fraction of individuals using a specific weight
will change slowly, even if its performance is especially good or bad. The last parameter k indicates
the intensity of choice. We use two values: 0.1 and 100. The higher, the more people are inclined to
switch to the best performing heuristic.
We use all the combinations of these parameters for 10 different initial distributions of weights,
i.e. initial fractions of individuals using the different heuristics. These are given in Table 2. For
example, in (1), all agents start by using Adaptive (1) to form expectations. When one heuristic is
5We performed the analysis as well for ✓ = 10 but the results are highly similar to ✓ = 4.
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Table 2: Different initial distributions for the weights (fractions of individuals using the specific heuris-
tics).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 1,0 (Adaptive (1)) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 2,0 (Adaptive (2)) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 3,0 (Trend (1)) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 4,0 (Trend (2)) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 5,0 (Average (1)) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1/7 0 1/3
 6,0 (Average (2)) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1/7 0 1/3
 7,0 (Myopic) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/7 0 1/3
used extensively in the first periods of the transition period, this could lead to different dynamics
compared to when a second heuristic is used heavily in the beginning.
7.2 Results
7.2.1 With vs without heuristic switching for   = 0.98 and ✓ = 4
The results for   = 0.98 and ✓ = 4 with and without heuristic switching are given in Figure 16.
The three panels on the left concern the scenarios without heuristic switching. They display the
median transitional dynamics for output, the real wage rate and the forecast errors for all the different
heuristics over all the different parameter values for  1,  2,  5 and  6 as discussed in subsection
7.1.1. The three panels on the right concern the results with heuristic switching for   = 0.98 and
✓ = 4. For each combination of respectively ⇠,   and k, they show the median transitional path
over all the combinations for  1,  2,  5 and  6 and over all initial distributions as given in Table 2.
Furthermore, for the panels with heuristic switching, we also give an indication of the variation in the
transitional dynamics over all different scenarios. Note that the RE case is displayed using the dashed
line.
We start with the discussion for the results without heuristic switching. In the first period, the
difference between output in the rational expectations case (dashed line) and the heuristic scenarios
is most pronounced. In the RE case, the value for wt is lower than the value in the old steady state
due to the higher labor supply. For the different heuristics, however, the expectation for the wage
equals the value for the real pre-tax wage rate in the old steady state. As the individuals base their
labour supply on their expectation for w, they supply more labour relative to the RE case leading to
a higher level of output. Afterwards, output decreases as employment decreases, but the increase in
Kt counteracts this decrease to some extent. These panels indicate that substantial output gains can
be achieved compared to the rational expectations case. In all heuristic cases, output overshoots its
6The permanent decrease in the labour tax occurs in period 1. The value for output in the old steady state is 16.6. The
initial steady state level for the pre-tax wage is 1. The results for   = 0.86/✓ = 4,   = 0.98/✓ = 10,   = 0.86/✓ = 10
and   = 0.98/✓ = 2 are similar and are therefore not displayed in this text. The conclusions mentioned in the text apply to
these configurations as well. The results for   = 0.86/  = 2 are discussed in the next subsection.
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RE counterpart. This effect is most pronounced in the adaptive expectations case, since expectations
are lagging behind the most. When individuals use the trend heuristic, there is some oscillation in the
beginning. Overshooting is the largest when average expectations are used.
Unsurprisingly, the dynamics of the actual real wage rate are closely related to the heuristic used
to form expectations. At first, the real wage rate is lower than its RE counterpart, but it quickly
catches up. The panels in the last row show the forecast errors. The forecast error is negative when
the expected value is bigger than the actual value and positive otherwise. The oscillation following
the trend heuristic is also clear from the panels in the last row of Figure 1. The forecast error changes
in sign compared to the period before and gradually it converges to zero. In the adaptive expectations
case, forecast errors are always negative. Average expectations lead to a negative forecast error in the
beginning. Around the fifteenth period, they become positive for some periods.
Most importantly, these panels indicate that even for very common parameter values for   and ✓,
the resulting dynamics, both for output and wages but also for all the other variables, are substantially
different from the dynamics in the rational expectations case. Second, they show that the resulting
dynamics depend on the heuristic that is used and the parameterisation of that heuristic. Thus, there is
a certain degree of variation in the dynamics.
As for the results with heuristic switching, one can see that the distance between the values of
respectively + 1 standard deviation and -1 standard deviation from the mean value in each period is
small and quickly becomes smaller as time goes by. Thus, in a framework without rational expecta-
tions and with heuristic switching, the effects of a labour tax decrease become much more predictable
and monotonic even though a lot of individuals have different ways of forming expectations and even
considering different initial distributions. The heuristic switching framework enables policy makers
to better anticipate the effects of tax changes.
Figure 2 displays the boxplot of the value of Equation (17) for each period for each heuristic over
the transition. This figure gives a lot of information on how the different heuristics are performing
over the transition period. The two adaptive heuristics and the two average heuristics perform the best
in the beginning, as they are overall the slowest ones to adjust their expectations. The trend rules
are the worst performers in the beginning. Over time, the myopic expectations heuristic gradually
becomes the best performing heuristic based on the median value of Equation (17). Another aspect
worth mentioning is the fact that for the adaptive and trend heuristics, the range of the values for
Equation (17) is much bigger compared to the others. This means that in some cases, especially when
the adjustment factors  1 and  2 are high, these heuristics perform extremely bad. For the adaptive
heuristics, this is typically after the tenth period.
The main message here is that after the heuristic switching regime has been activated, the variation
in the transitional dynamics decreases significantly, meaning that the transitional effects of a decrease
in labour taxes become more predictable and monotonic over all different parameter values in the
specifications of the heuristics (both extreme and moderate) and of the parameters in Equations (17)
and (18) and over all possible initial distributions. Thus, allowing for alternative expectations and a
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lot of heterogeneity in terms of initial fractions does not lead to a wide range of possible transitional
paths, but decreases in fact the range in which the transitional dynamics are located.
7.2.2 With vs without heuristic switching for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2
In the previous subsection, we discussed the results for   =0.98 and ✓ = 4. As mentioned previously,
we also performed the same analysis for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2. We will, however, discuss the results in a
different way as we want to highlight a different feature of the heuristic switching approach compared
to the previous subsection.
Figure 1 showed that in all of the scenarios, the transitional dynamics converge to the steady
state. This is not always the case, however. In Figure 3, we include the transitional dynamics for
output for all the different heuristics but without heuristic switching when   = 0.86/✓=2 and over
all the different parameter values as discussed in subsection 7.1.1. For a lot of the scenarios, the
transitional dynamics oscillate around the steady state or even diverge. The oscillations are very large
in some cases. Not surprisingly, in all the adaptive and trend scenarios in which individuals adjust their
expectations faster ( 1 and  2 equal to 0.9), the dynamics diverge or experience large oscillations. For
smaller weights, the dynamics oscillate to a smaller extent. The variation in the dynamics is thus very
big.
With heuristic switching, the conclusion is different. Figure 4 reveals that the heuristic switching
approach has a stabilising effect on the dynamics. Only when the agents using the adaptive heuristic
and the ones using the trend heuristic are simultaneously aggressive in adjusting their expectations
( 1 =  2 = 0.9), the dynamics oscillate in some cases. In all other cases, the heuristic switching
approach stabilises the dynamics.
Figures 5 and 6 further examine the sensitivity of the results to the memory parameter ( ), the noise
parameter (k) and the inertia parameter (⇠) for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2. First, the results for   = 0.2.
Only when k = 100 and ⇠ = 0.9 do all the different simulations over the parameter values for the
specification of the heuristics and the initial distributions converge. So even when  1 =  2 = 0.9,
the scenario which appeared to be problematic in the previous figure. When the noise is low, the
economic agents will be more able to detect the better performing heuristics. Combined with high
inertia, meaning that economic agents don’t quickly switch from heuristic, this leads to a stabilising
effect for all cases. The value of k is more important than ⇠. Even for low inertia, if there is not a lot
of noise, the lion’s share of the simulations converge.
When the memory parameter is higher, the conclusions from the previous figure are even stronger.
In this case, whenever k = 100, the dynamics will converge to the steady state, even for low inertia.
The oscillations in the cases where k = 0.1 are also smaller than their counterparts in Figure 5.
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Figure 1: Transitional dynamics after a labour tax decrease for different heuristics and under rational expectations scenario
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Figure 2: Boxplot of the Squared Prediction Error for w for the different heuristics over the transition period
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Figure 3: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2 without heuristic switching
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Figure 4: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2 with heuristic
switching split up for different combinations of  1 and  2
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8 Conclusion
This paper explores the stability and transitional dynamics of an overlapping generations model with
heuristic switching. Accordingly, this paper contributes to a growing literature that goes beyond the
rational expectations paradigm. We assume that agents use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the
future course of the interest rate and the real wage. Agents use these heuristics because, in general,
they do not possess the cognitive abilities as assumed by the RE literature nor to act as econometri-
cians. Instead, the agents have a certain number of different heuristics at their disposal. On a regular
basis, they assess the predictive power of the heuristic they are currently applying. If it performs well,
the probability that agents will use the same heuristic in the next period will be higher. If it does not
perform well, there is a higher probability that they switch to another rule.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature that goes beyond the rational expectations
paradigm by exploiting the heuristic switching approach within an Overlapping Generations model.
Triggered by a fiscal policy shock, the objective is to study the transitional dynamics of the model
for a large number of settings including one or multiple heuristics and compare the behaviour of the
dynamics with their rational expectations counterpart.
The simulations lead to three main findings. First, in a context without heuristic switching (i.e. a
context where individuals only have one heuristic at their disposal to form expectations), the evolution
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Figure 5: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86, ✓ = 2 and   = 0.2: sensitivity
of results to different values of the inertia and the noise
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Figure 6: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86, ✓ = 2 and   = 0.9: sensitivity
of results to different values of the inertia and the noise
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of transitional dynamics can be substantially different from the rational expectations case, especially
in the first periods of the transition. Furthermore, there is a lot of variation in the dynamics over
different parameter values and heuristics. This finding implies that if only heuristic is used, the mac-
roeconomic impact of fiscal policy is highly sensitive to the heuristic being used. What is more,
as the discount rate and the degree of risk aversion decrease, the model becomes unstable and the
corresponding transitional dynamics oscillate or even diverge. Second, after activating the heuristic
switching regime, the variation in the transitional dynamics decreases significantly. Consequently, the
sensitivity of the transitional effects of fiscal policy is much lower now and its exact impact is thus
less uncertain for policy makers. Third and last, the heuristic switching has a stabilising effect on the
transitional dynamics. For certain configurations of the parameter values for which the dynamics were
very unstable in the absence of heuristic switching, the dynamics now converge to the steady state in
most cases.
These findings are important. They imply that allowing individuals to choose from a wide range
of forecasting rules is actually a better option than constraining them to use only forecasting rule. It
allows them to select the better performing rules, a feature that not only enhances the stability of the
model, but reduces the uncertainty in the transitional dynamics as well.
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